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The precautionary principle is a legal principle that has found considerable 
support in international environmental law. Its emergence, however, has not 
been without problems and controversies: how do we define its normative 
content and trigger elements, and how do we ensure concrete implementation. 
The 2011 Seabed Mining Advisory Opinion used states’ due diligence obligations 
to prevent harm to realize the precautionary principle. Focusing on this case, 
this article examines how the precautionary principle can be applied using the 
concept of due diligence. First, this article explores the precautionary concept 
using examples from a selection of regional and multilateral environmental 
instruments, analyzing its origin and different expressions and identifying the 
problems in its application. Second, the article analyzes the Pulp Mills case and 
the Seabed Mining Advisory Opinion to substantiate the role of the obligation to 
take precautionary measures in the legal framework of due diligence. Third, by 
reference to the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on Prevention 
of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities and the International Law 
Association’s study report on the Legal Principles relating to Climate Change, 
along with a number of international cases, the article further illustrates the 
distinction between due diligence, prevention and precaution and argues that 
they are actually interrelated. 
Citation: (2016) 25 Dal J Leg Stud 1. 
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The precautionary principle is one of the emergent legal principles that has 
received increased awareness from states and academic literature.1 Although this 
principle has achieved a level of sophistication in international environmental law, 
a uniform understanding has not been reached regarding its meaning, normative 
content, and legal status.2 Nor has its application and consequence become 
precise.3 In 2011, however, the advisory opinion of the Seabed Disputes Chamber 
of the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) on Responsibilities and 
Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with respect to Activities in the Area 
(Seabed Mining Advisory Opinion) shed some light on the concrete application of the 
precautionary approach.4 The Chamber indicated that the precautionary 
approach is “an integral part of the general obligation of due diligence.”5 Up until 
now, precaution and the due diligence obligation to prevent harm have been 
                                                                                                                                         
1 For detailed analyses of the use of precautionary concept in national laws, and regional and international 
instruments see e.g. James Cameron & Juli Abouchar, “The Precautionary Principle: A Fundamental 
Principle of Law and Policy for the Protection of the Global Environment” (1991) 14:1 Boston College 
Intl & Comp L Rev 1 at 4–18; Chris Tollefson & Jamie Thornback, “Litigating the Precautionary Principle 
in Domestic Courts” (2008) 19:1 J Envtl L & Prac 33 at 35–48; Andri G Wibisana, “The Development of 
the Precautionary Principle in International and Indonesian Environmental Law” (2011) 14 Asia Pac J 
Envtl L 169 at 172–78, 190–202 [Wibisana]. A large number of academic writings have touched on this 
topic. See e.g. David Freestone & Ellen Hey, eds, The Precautionary Principle and International Law: The 
Challenge of Implementation (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1996) [Freestone & Hey]; Joakim Zander, 
The Application of the Precautionary Principle in Practice: Comparative Dimensions (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010); James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law, 8th ed (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2012) at 357–58 [Crawford]; Bénédicte Sage-Fuller, The Precautionary Principle in 
Marine Environmental Law, With Special Reference to High Risk Vessels (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2013) 
[Sage-Fuller]. 
2 Philippe Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law, 2nd ed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2003) at 272; Barbara Nicoletti, “The Prevention of Natural and Man-Made Disasters: What Duties for 
States?” in Andrea de Guttry, Marco Gestri & Gabriella Venturini, eds, International Disaster Response Law 
(The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2012) 177 at 188; Wibisana, supra note 1 at 170–71; Crawford, supra note 
1 at 357; Sage-Fuller, supra note 1 at 82. 
3 James E Hickey, Jr & Vern R Walker, “Refining the Precautionary Principle in International Environmental 
Law” (1995) 14:3 Va Envtl LJ 423 at 424–25; Cass R Sunstein, “Beyond the Precautionary Principle” 
(2003) 151:3 U Pa L Rev 1003 at 1004–08; Elizabeth Tedsen & Gesa Homann, “Implementing the 
Precautionary Principle for Climate Engineering” (2013) 7:2 Carbon & Climate L Rev 90 at 94–95 [Tedsen 
& Homann]. 
4 Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with respect to Activities in the Area (1 February 
2011), Advisory Opinion, the Seabed Disputes Chamber of the International Tribunal on the Law of the 
Sea, No 17 [Seabed Mining Advisory Opinion]. “The Seabed Disputes Chamber is competent to give an 
advisory opinion on legal questions arising within the scope of the activities of the Assembly or Council of 
the International Seabed Authority.” See ITLOS, Jurisdiction, online: 
<https://www.itlos.org/jurisdiction/>.   
5 Seabed Mining Advisory Opinion, supra note 4 at para 131. 
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widely treated as separate principles. The Chamber’s reasoning highlights the fact 
that they are actually interrelated.  
This article draws upon the obligations of due diligence to clarify the 
question of how to apply the precautionary principle even though the principle 
itself has not yet emerged as an independent international custom. In section one, 
I explore the precautionary concept by analyzing the origin and different 
expressions of this concept (the precautionary principle, the precautionary 
approach and precautionary measures). I also present the problems in applying 
the precautionary principle. In section two, I conduct case analyses to observe 
the role that the duty to take precautionary measures plays in the legal framework 
of due diligence. The analytical framework elaborated in the 2010 Pulp Mills on the 
River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay)6 and the 2011 Seabed Mining Advisory Opinion 
will serve to inform this paper. As the principles of precaution and due diligence 
are also closely related to the obligation to prevent harm, I further illustrate the 
distinction and interrelation between these three concepts in section three. I refer 
to the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on Prevention of 
Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities (2001 Draft Articles)7 and 
the International Law Association’s study report on the Legal Principles relating 
to Climate Change.8 These two instruments have elaborated on the relationship 
between prevention, precaution and due diligence. 
Following the common law maxim “sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas” (use 
your own property in such a way as not to injure that of others),9 the notion of 
                                                                                                                                         
6 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay), [2010] ICJ Rep 14 [Pulp Mills]. 
7 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, with 
Commentaries (2001) [ILC]. 
8 International Law Association, Washington Conference Report: Legal Principles relating to Climate Change (2014) 
[ILA]. 
9 More details about this maxim see Elmer E Smead, “Sic Utere Tuo Ut Alienum Non Laedas: A Basis of the 
State Police Power” (1936) 21:2 Cornell L Rev 276; Greg Lynham, “The Sic Utere Principle as Customary 
International Law: A Case of Wishful Thinking?” (1995) 2 James Cook U L Rev 172. 
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prevention is used in international law to deal with transboundary harm. The 
obligation to prevent transboundary harm was elaborated in principle 21 of the 
1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment (Stockholm 
Declaration).10 It imposes an obligation on states not to cause damage to “the 
environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction” 
when they exercise their sovereign right to “exploit their own natural resources 
pursuant to their own environmental policies.”11 The 2001 Draft Articles 
affirmed this obligation in article 3, which reads, “The State of origin shall take 
all appropriate measures to prevent significant transboundary harm or at any 
event to minimize the risk thereof.”12 
Under the obligation of prevention, states should ensure that activities 
within their jurisdiction do not harm an extraterritorial environment. All states 
are obligated to prevent cross-border environmental hazards and activities that 
entail foreseeable environmental risks. They are also required to take international 
responsibility for the wrongful acts under their control. However, states are only 
responsible for activities that are (or can be) proved with clear evidence or the 
existence of foreseeable risks.13 Thus, when clear scientific evidence does not 
exist or when an environmental risk has not been reasonably foreseeable, the 
obligation of prevention is unable to require states to regulate environmental 
risks.14 The emergence of the precautionary concept was an attempt to fill this 
gap. 
The precautionary concept originated from the concept of “vorsorgeprinzip” 
(foresight) in German environmental law in 1971.15 This concept evolved 
gradually through regional environmental agreements in the 1980s. For example, 
the Ministerial Declaration Calling for Reduction of Pollution, adopted in the 
                                                                                                                                         
10 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, 16 June 1972, 11 ILM 1416 [Stockholm Declaration]. 
11 Ibid, principle 21. 
12 ILC, supra note 7 at 153. 
13 ILC, ibid at 153–54; Sage-Fuller, supra note 1 at 79. 
14 Freestone & Hey, supra note 1 at 54. 
15 Ibid at 4; Tedsen & Homann, supra note 3 at 91. 
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Second International Conference on the Protection of the North Sea, declared 
that “[in] order to protect the North Sea from possibly damaging effects of the 
most dangerous substances, a precautionary approach is necessary which may 
require action to control inputs of such substances even before a causal link has 
been established by absolute clear scientific evidence.”16 Numerous multilateral 
agreements have since appropriated the precautionary concept directly or 
indirectly to control environmental pollution, and to protect marine and 
atmospheric environment and international biological resources. Principle 15 of 
the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (Rio Declaration) 
is a representative example:  
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall 
be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there 
are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific 
certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective 
measures to prevent environmental degradation.17  
This definition demonstrates that the precautionary approach was 
established to bypass the traditional rules of evidence that cannot effectively 
respond to or deal with a situation in which clear scientific evidence for 
environmental harm or risk is inadequate. The precautionary principle 
emphasizes that the implementation of necessary measures, in the occurrence of 
environmental risks, should not be postponed due to the lack of scientific 
certainty. This principle has an important role to play in effectively coping with 
environmental risks of scientific uncertainty. 
The precautionary concept has been incorporated into a number of 
international environmental instruments. The specific terms that reflect this 
concept include the precautionary principle, the precautionary approach and 
precautionary measures. 
                                                                                                                                         
16 Freestone & Hey, supra note 1 at 5. 
17 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 14 June 1992, 31 ILM 874, principle 15 [Rio Declaration]. 
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The term “precautionary principle” is not explicitly used to address the 
concept of precaution in multilateral environmental agreements. Article 2.5 (a) of 
the 1992 Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses 
and International Lakes requires states to follow the precautionary principle. 
Measures to prevent cross-border effects of hazardous substances should not be 
postponed due to non-existence of clear scientific evidence that could prove the 
causal link between those hazardous substances and their potential transboundary 
effects.18  
The notions of prevention and precaution were combined in the 1991 
Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of 
Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes within Africa 
(Bamako Convention).19 Article 4.3 (f) of this convention provides that each state 
shall endeavor to adopt preventive and precautionary approaches to avoid the 
damage caused by substances released in the environment. In achieving this goal, 
states shall take appropriate measures in a cooperative manner to implement the 
precautionary principle, which does not require waiting for scientific evidence to 
prove harm to the environment.20 As well, article 2.2 (a) of the 1992 Convention 
for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic 
requires states to apply the precautionary principle.21 They should adopt 
preventive measures when there are reasonable grounds to believe that direct or 
indirect discharge of substances into the marine environment may “[endanger] 
human health, harm living resources and marine ecosystems, damage amenities 
or interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea, even when there is no conclusive 
evidence of a causal relationship between the inputs and the effects.”22 
                                                                                                                                         
18 Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, 17 March 1992, 1936 
UNTS 269 (entered into force 6 October 1996), art 2.5 (a). 
19 Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movement and Management of 
Hazardous Wastes within Africa, 29 January 1991, 30 ILM 773. 
20 Ibid, art 4.3 (f). 
21 Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic, 22 September 1992, 2354 UNTS 
67 (entered into force 25 March 1998), art 2.2 (a). 
22 Ibid. 
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Instead of explicitly using the term “precautionary principle”, several 
instruments require states to take a precautionary approach when trigger elements 
are satisfied.23 Article 6 of the 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the 
Provisions of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea relating to the 
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory 
Fish Stocks (Fish Stocks Agreement) stipulates the application of the 
precautionary approach.24 States are required to widely use the precautionary 
approach to conserve, manage and exploit the stocks of straddling fish and highly 
migratory fish25 and “shall be more cautious when information is uncertain, 
unreliable or inadequate.”26 They cannot delay or refuse to take conservation and 
management measures because of inadequate scientific information.27 
Meanwhile, in order to strengthen states’ capacity to manage risks and facilitate 
the development of relevant technologies, this agreement requires states to 
implement the precautionary approach by drawing upon the best available 
scientific information and technology to deal with risks and uncertainties, 
considering uncertainties related to the size and productivity of fish stocks, and 
collecting data to assess the impact of fishing activities on other associated or 
independent species and oceanic environment.28 
The overall purpose of the 2000 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (Cartagena Protocol) is to control 
transboundary movements of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) based on 
the precautionary concept.29 This concept has been reflected in many parts of the 
                                                                                                                                         
23 Arguably, trigger elements include “reasonable foreseeability of damage falling short of conclusive scientific 
proof” and “a threat of serious or irreversible damage”. See ILA, supra note 8 at 24. 
24 UNGA, Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, 6th Sess, Agreement for the 
Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to 
the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, UN Doc 
A/CONF.164/37, September 1995. 
25 Ibid, art 6.1. 
26 Ibid, art 6.2. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid, art 6.3. 
29 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 29 January 2000, 2226 UNTS 208 (entered 
into force 11 September 2003) [Cartagena Protocol]. 
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Cartagena Protocol. Paragraph 4 of its preamble is a literal reaffirmation of the 
precautionary approach elaborated in principle 15 of the Rio Declaration.30  
Article 1 provides that the precautionary approach should be adopted to 
achieve the objective of this protocol.31 Articles 10 (6) and 11 (8) do not use the 
term “precautionary approach”, but the language in these two articles denotes the 
precautionary concept, including language targeting a “lack of scientific 
certainty”, “insufficient relevant scientific information and knowledge” and the 
“avoid[ance] or minimiz[ation of]…potential adverse effects”.32 The Cartagena 
Protocol is a good example of the capacity of the precautionary concept to deal 
with a specific environmental problem.  
The term “precautionary measures” is also used to reflect the precautionary 
concept. One example is the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete 
the Ozone Layer.33 In its preamble paragraph 6, parties to this protocol were 
determined to “protect the ozone layer by taking precautionary measures to 
control equitably total global emissions that deplete it.”34 Paragraph 8 notes that 
some precautionary measures have been taken to control the release of certain 
chlorofluorocarbons at the national and regional level.35 Similarly, article 3.3 of 
the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) provides 
that:  
The Parties should take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent 
or minimize the causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse 
effects. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack 
of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing 
such measures, taking into account that policies and measures to deal 
                                                                                                                                         
30 Ibid, preamble, para 4.  
31 Ibid, art 1. 
32 Ibid, arts 10 (6), 11 (8). 
33 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 16 September 1987, 1522 UNTS 3 (entered into 
force 1 January 1989). 
34 Ibid, preamble, para 6. 
35 Ibid, preamble, para 8. 
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with climate change should be cost-effective so as to ensure global 
benefits at the lowest possible cost.36  
In order to make the obligations of limiting the use of fossil fuels under the 
UNFCCC more specific and clear, nearly 160 states negotiated and agreed to 
adopt the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC (Kyoto Protocol) in 1997.37 While the 
term “precautionary measures” do not appear in the protocol, paragraph 4 of its 
preamble addresses that this protocol should refer to article 3 of the UNFCCC.38 
Thus, the Kyoto Protocol still embraced the idea of precaution and regarded it as 
a justification for taking measures to reduce emissions. 
In addition to the direct use of “precaution” in provisions, some instruments 
only have provisions that implicitly reflect the precautionary concept. Besides 
articles 10 (6) and 11 (8) of the Cartagena Protocol discussed above, another 
example is the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD).39 Paragraph 9 of 
its preamble provides that when biodiversity suffers “a serious threat of 
significant reduction or loss”, lack of adequate scientific certainty cannot be a 
reason for postponing measures that aim to avoid or minimize such threats.40 In 
contrast to the Rio Declaration and other multilateral environmental agreements 
that directly used the term of precautionary principle, precautionary approach or 
precautionary measure, the CBD did not draw upon these terms but elaborated 
the precautionary concept in its provisions. Although the CBD is viewed as an 
instrument that intends to adopt the precautionary concept for use in practice, 
the drafters’ use of language (i.e., avoiding the direct use of the term “precaution” 
and providing the precautionary concept in the preamble) shows that state parties 
simply wished to regard the precautionary concept as a reference material rather 
than as a binding legal obligation. 
                                                                                                                                         
36 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 9 May 1992, 1771 UNTS 107 (entered into force 21 
March 1994), art 3.3. 
37 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 11 December 1997, 2303 UNTS 148 
(entered into force 16 February 2005). 
38 Ibid, preamble, para 4. 
39 Convention on Biological Diversity, 5 June 1992, 1760 UNTS 79 (entered into force 29 December 1993). 
40 Ibid, preamble, para 9. 
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Despite various permutations of the precautionary concept found in the 
instruments above, the content of precaution is similar. The concept arguably 
consists of the types of risk (serious, irreversible or other types), the degree of 
scientific uncertainty, the criteria that should be considered in the decision making 
process (proportionality and cost-effect analysis), and a shifting burden of 
proof.41 
The precautionary principle highlights that the lack of full scientific certainty 
should not be used as a reason for postponing the use of cost-effective measures 
to prevent environmental degradation. It may serve as a general reference or 
policy guideline for decision-makers to manage environmental risks when there 
exists scientific uncertainty. In contrast to the precautionary principle as a legal 
principle, the precautionary approach and precautionary measures are expedient 
and temporary tools based on the precautionary concept to achieve the goal of 
risk management.  Fewer conventions directly use the term “principle” than the 
terms “approach” or “measures”. One reason may be that the term “principle” 
may direct a court to view it as a source of law. In other words, the precautionary 
principle may convey a more compulsory meaning than the precautionary 
approach and precautionary measures.42 
Meanwhile, the precautionary concept is mostly reflected in the preambles 
of multilateral environmental instruments, thus serving a symbolic role. The 
principle lacks any specific and clear implementation mechanisms and does not 
create concrete or practical obligations for states. Even if several instruments 
(e.g., the Bamako Convention, the Fish Stocks Agreement and the Cartagena 
Protocol) have specific provisions for implementing the precautionary approach, 
it is still too early to conclude that they have made a real contribution to the 
implementation of the precautionary principle. For example, major GMOs 
exporting states such as the US and Argentina have not signed or ratified the 
Cartagena Protocol, whereas many parties to this protocol have less influence in 
                                                                                                                                         
41 Tedsen & Homann, supra note 3 at 93; Miguel A. Recuerda, “Dangerous Interpretations of the 
Precautionary Principle and the Foundational Values of European Union Food Law: Risk Versus Risk” 
(2008) 4:1 J Food L & Policy 1 at 19 [Recuerda]. 
42 Recuerda, supra note 41 at 5. 
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producing, selling or importing the GMOs.43 Similarly, although the 
precautionary concept appears in many parts of the Cartagena Protocol, it only 
uses the term “precautionary approach” in its preamble and text. Articles 10 (6) and 
11 (8) are the specific provisions to implement the precautionary approach, but 
they do not directly use precaution in their wordings.44 
Since the emergence of the precautionary concept, a series of controversies 
have arisen over its precise normative content, trigger elements and legal status 
in international law. The specific questions include “the level and type of harm 
that would justify action, the amount of knowledge needed to justify action, the 
types of actions that would be appropriate as precautionary measures, and under 
what circumstances these would be appropriate.”45 While several international 
instruments have direct and indirect provisions that reflect the precautionary 
concept, they have no specific provisions to implement this concept. If trigger 
elements of this principle are uncertain, measures taken to avoid risks under the 
precautionary concept may cause more controversies. Thus, the precautionary 
principle or precautionary approach should be undertaken in a more cautious way 
to reduce its adverse impacts. Two recent cases seem to have implications for the 
application of precaution.  
                                                                                                                                         
43 See UNTS, “Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity” (status as at 12 
September 2016), online: 
<https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-8-
a&chapter=27&clang=_en>; Natural Revolution, “List of Countries That Banned Genetically Modified 
Food” (9 February 2015), online: <http://naturalrevolution.org/list-countries-banned-genetically-
modified-food/>. 
44 Cartagena Protocol, supra note 29, arts 10 (6), 11 (8). 
45 Tedsen & Homann, supra note 3 at 94. 
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In the 2010 Pulp Mills case, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) decided 
that Uruguay violated the obligation to notify Argentina under article 7 of the 
Statute of the River Uruguay signed by Uruguay and Argentina in 1975 (1975 
Statute).46 Uruguay had not informed the Administrative Commission of the 
River Uruguay (CARU) of its plans before granting environmental authorizations 
for the CMB (ENCE) mill and the Orion (Botnia) mill and for the port terminal 
at Fray Bentos.47  
In reaching its decision, the ICJ noted that the obligation to notify CARU is 
a necessary part of fulfilling the obligation of prevention. With such notification, 
the parties may “consult in order to assess the risks of the plan and to negotiate 
possible changes which may eliminate those risks or minimize their effects.”48 
The Court restated the status of the preventive principle as an international 
custom and pointed out that this principle had originated from the obligation of 
due diligence.49 Its analysis was based on the specific holding from the Corfu 
Channel case that every state had the “obligation not to allow knowingly its 
territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States.”50 The Advisory 
Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Nuclear Weapons Advisory 
Opinion) echoed this point, stating: “[t]he existence of the general obligation of 
States to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction and control respect the 
                                                                                                                                         
46 The Statute of the River Uruguay, 26 February 1975, 1982 UNTS 339 (entered into force 18 September 1976) 
[1975 Statute]. 
47 Pulp Mills, supra note 6 at paras 111, 122. 
48 Ibid at para 115. 
49 Ibid at para 101. 
50 Corfu Channel (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v Albania), [1949] ICJ Rep 4 at 22. 
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environment of other States or of areas beyond national control is now part of 
the corpus of international law relating to the environment.”51  
A state should take all possible measures to discharge the obligation of 
prevention. Under article 36 of the 1975 Statute, both Uruguay and Argentina 
had the obligation to take measures to avoid changes in the ecological balance of 
the Uruguay River.52 These measures included both the adoption of a regulatory 
or administrative framework and the compliance by both parties to that 
framework.53 The obligation to adopt regulatory measures could be regarded as 
an “obligation of conduct”.54 The ICJ suggested Uruguay and Argentina to 
“exercise due diligence…to preserve the ecological balance of the river.”55 Article 
41 of the 1975 Statute has a similar provision, obligating states to “prevent 
pollution and preserve the aquatic environment.”56 This obligation should also be 
taken with due diligence. In addition to the adoption and enforcement of 
appropriate measures, the obligations of due diligence under this article require 
that these measures be “in accordance with applicable international agreements 
and in keeping, where relevant, with the guidelines and recommendations of 
international technical bodies.”57 Thus, the measures taken by states to realize the 
obligation of due diligence should conform to both domestic laws and regulations 
and international agreements and standards. 
When addressing the preliminary issue of the “burden of proof” in this case, 
the ICJ mentioned the relevance of the precautionary approach in interpreting 
and applying the provisions of the 1975 Statute.58 However, the court did not 
follow Argentina’s argument that a precautionary approach operates as a reversal 
                                                                                                                                         
51 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, [1996] ICJ Rep 226 at para 29 [Nuclear 
Weapons Advisory Opinion]. 
52 1975 Statute, supra note 46, art 36. 
53 Pulp Mills, supra note 6 at para 187. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid at para 190. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid at paras 159–60, 164. 
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of the burden of proof, placing the burden of proof equally on both Argentina 
and Uruguay.59 It insisted on the principle of onus probandi incumbit actori that, “[I]t 
is the duty of the party which asserts certain facts to establish the existence of 
such facts.”60 The burden of proof was still on Argentina to show Uruguay’s 
breach of obligations under the 1975 Statute. 
However, Judges Awn Al-Khasawneh, Bruno Simma and Cançado Trindade 
in this case indicated the possible application of the precautionary principle.61 
Judges Al-Khasawneh and Simma contended that the Court should consider the 
environmental risk posed on the Uruguay River after the completion of pulp mills 
rather than restrict its consideration to the identified risks or the harm that had 
occurred.62 They regretted that the Court had not made a contribution to 
resolving scientifically complex disputes.63 
Judge Trindade shared a similar opinion with Al-Khasawneh and Simma. He 
criticized the Court’s silence in deciding the relationship between the preventive 
principle and the precautionary principle.64 He also questioned whether the Court 
had acted with too much prudence and caution with respect to the precautionary 
principle.65 It was Trindade’s opinion that the precautionary principle is a 
“reasonable assessment in face of probable risks and scientific uncertainties.”66 
This principle could be implemented by undertaking “environmental impact 
assessments, further studies on the environmental issues at stake, as well as 
careful environmental risk analysis.”67 He believed that the mere application of 
the preventive principle could not suffice to resolve the dispute. Instead of fully 
                                                                                                                                         
59 Ibid at para 164. 
60 Ibid at para 162. 
61 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay), [2010] ICJ Rep 14, Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges 
Al-Khasawneh and Simma at paras 25, 28 [Al-Khasawneh & Simma]; Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay 
(Argentina v Uruguay), [2010] ICJ Rep 14, Separate Opinion of Judge Trindade at paras 67, 96 [Trindade]. 
62 Al-Khasawneh & Simma, supra note 61 at para 25. 
63 Ibid at para 28. 
64 Trindade, supra note 61 at para 67. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid at para 96. 
67 Ibid. 
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relying on the prevention of harm, he turned the attention to the precautionary 
principle by examining risks and scientific uncertainties.68 
In 2011, the Seabed Disputes Chamber of the ITLOS adopted an advisory 
opinion to clarify states parties’ legal responsibilities and obligations in 
sponsoring activities in the seabed area beyond national jurisdiction (Area).69 The 
Chamber considered the notions of due diligence and precaution by connecting 
sponsoring states’ direct obligations with the obligations of due diligence.70 The 
obligations of due diligence require a state to exercise best possible efforts to 
avoid harm to the Area or other states. The specific content of due diligence may 
be ascertained by referring to direct obligations undertaken by the state. 
The Chamber first analyzed the obligation “to ensure compliance and 
liability for damage” (obligation to ensure) by interpreting article 139 of the 1982 
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and article 4 of Annex III to 
UNCLOS.71 Article 139 (1) of UNCLOS makes states responsible “to ensure that 
activities in the Area, whether carried out by States Parties, or state enterprises or 
natural or juridical persons which possess the nationality of States Parties or are 
effectively controlled by them or their nationals, shall be carried out in conformity 
with this Part.”72 Article 4 (4) of Annex III adds more requirements to article 139, 
                                                                                                                                         
68 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay), [2010] ICJ Rep 14, Annex to Summary of the Judgment 
at 5. 
69 “The Seabed Disputes Chamber is established in accordance with Part XI, section 5, of [UNCLOS]…The 
Chamber has jurisdiction in disputes with respect to activities in the International Seabed Area.” See 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Chambers, online: <https://www.itlos.org/the-
tribunal/chambers/>. See also Seabed Mining Advisory Opinion, supra note 4. 
70 In order to conduct exploration and exploitation activities in the international seabed area, natural or judicial 
persons should be “either nationals of a State Party or effectively controlled by it or its nationals” and 
“sponsored by such States”. States that provide such sponsorship are called sponsoring states; agreements 
that are entered by sponsoring states and natural or judicial persons are called sponsoring agreement; 
natural or judicial persons that enter a sponsoring agreement with sponsoring states are called contractors. 
See Seabed Mining Advisory Opinion, supra note 4 at paras 74–81. 
71 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 3 (entered into force 16 
November 1994) [UNCLOS]. 
72 Ibid, art 139 (1). 
16 REALIZING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN DUE DILIGENCE Vol. 25 
 
“[Sponsoring states]…shall…have the responsibility to ensure, within their legal 
systems, that a contractor so sponsored shall carry out activities in the Area in 
conformity with the terms of its contract and its obligations under this 
Convention.”73 A sponsoring state may be exempted from liability if the state 
“has adopted laws and regulations and taken administrative measures which are, 
within the framework of its legal system, reasonably appropriate for securing 
compliance by persons under its jurisdiction.”74  
Under the Chamber’s interpretation, the state’s obligation may be regarded 
as an obligation “of conduct” but not “of result”.75 The Chamber stated that this 
obligation should not be understood as requiring sponsoring states to comply 
with UNCLOS in all circumstances. However, sponsoring states should take 
adequate measures, “to exercise best possible efforts, to do the utmost, to obtain 
this result.”76 The Chamber further highlighted the close connection between 
obligations of conduct and obligations of due diligence.77 Despite the difficult 
task of describing the content of due diligence, the Chamber’s analyses seem to 
have some helpful implications for deciding what measures can be considered as 
sufficiently diligent. For instance, the Chamber stated that it was necessary to 
consider the level of technological development at a certain time since the 
emergence of new science or technology may increase the level of requirement 
for due diligence.78 The extent of due diligence also depends on the risks arising 
from activities. The activities of high risk in the Area will accordingly require a 
high degree of due diligence.79  
Additional elements relevant to the content of due diligence can be explored 
by interpreting article 153 (4) of UNCLOS and Annex III article 4 (4). According 
to article 153 (4) of UNCLOS, states parties shall take all measures to assist the 
International Seabed Authority to ensure compliance with article 139,80 including 
                                                                                                                                         
73 Ibid, Annex III, art 4 (4). 
74 Ibid. 
75 Seabed Mining Advisory Opinion, supra note 4 at para 110. 
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77 Ibid at para 111. 
78 Ibid at para 117. 
79 Ibid. 
80 UNCLOS, supra note 71, art 153 (4). 
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“compliance with the relevant provisions of this Part and the Annexes relating 
thereto, and the rules, regulations and procedures of the [International Seabed] 
Authority, and the plans of work approved in accordance with [article 153 (3)].”81 
Also, article 4 (4) of Annex III requires sponsoring states to fulfill the obligation 
to ensure compliance with and liability for damage within the scope of their own 
legal system.82 These provisions both require sponsoring states to deploy all 
reasonably appropriate measures within their legal system, including adopting 
laws and taking administrative action. The extent of “reasonably appropriate” 
depends on whether these laws, regulations or administrative measures can 
suffice to secure compliance by persons under a state’s jurisdiction.83  
The Chamber considered the adoption of laws, regulations and 
administrative action and the establishment of relevant enforcement mechanisms 
as a necessary condition for states to comply with the obligation of due 
diligence.84 Merely entering into a sponsoring agreement between the sponsoring 
state and the sponsored contractor cannot be considered as compliance with the 
obligation of due diligence. The arrangement of signing a contract does not 
suffice to substitute the legal, regulatory and administrative measures.85 The 
Chamber suggested some necessary measures to help implement sponsoring 
states’ obligations, including, for example, adding provisions regarding “financial 
viability and technical capacity of sponsored contractors, conditions for issuing a 
certificate of sponsorship and penalties for non-compliance by such 
contractors.”86 In addition, the Chamber noted that the measures adopted by 
sponsoring states may not be perpetually appropriate, so they should be reviewed 
continuously so that they can meet the existing standards.87 
                                                                                                                                         
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid, Annex III, art 4 (4). 
83 Seabed Mining Advisory Opinion, supra note 4 at para 119. 
84 Ibid at para 218. 
85 Ibid at paras 223–24. 
86 Ibid at para 234. 
87 Ibid at para 222. 
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The obligations of sponsoring states are not simply restricted to the 
obligations of due diligence. They also include several direct obligations.88 Under 
UNCLOS, the 2000 Nodules Regulations, the 2010 Sulphides Regulations and 
other relevant instruments, sponsoring states are obligated to adopt a 
precautionary approach, to apply best environmental practices, to ensure the 
availability of recourse for compensation, to take measures to ensure the 
provision of guarantees in the event of an emergency order by the Authority for 
protecting the marine environment, and to conduct environmental impact 
assessment.89 Although the Seabed Disputes Chamber considered these direct 
obligations as independent from the obligations of due diligence, it also stressed 
that direct obligations and obligations of due diligence were closely interrelated 
because the fulfillment of direct obligations could satisfy the requirements of due 
diligence.90 In other words, the content of due diligence can be determined by 
interpreting sponsoring states’ direct obligations. 
Adopting a precautionary approach is an essential part of the direct 
obligations for sponsoring states. The Seabed Disputes Chamber conducted a 
detailed analysis of the application of a precautionary approach. The Chamber 
did not directly refer to the precautionary approach elaborated in principle 15 of 
the Rio Declaration due to its non-binding force. Instead, the Chamber drew 
upon the Sulphides Regulations and the Nodules Regulations that “[transformed 
the] non-binding statement of the precautionary approach in the Rio Declaration 
into a binding obligation.”91 Regulation 31 (2) of the Nodules Regulations and 
regulation 33 (2) of the Sulphides Regulations both provide that, “In order to 
ensure effective protection for the marine environment from harmful effects 
                                                                                                                                         
88 Ibid at para 121. 
89 Ibid at para 122. The International Seabed Authority (ISA) adopted the Nodules Regulations in 2000 and the 
Sulphides Regulations in 2010 to regulate the prospecting, exploration and exploitation of marine minerals 
in the international seabed area. See ISA, “The 2000 Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for 
Polymetallic Nodules in the Area” (13 July 2000), online: 
<http://www.isa.org.jm/files/documents/EN/Regs/MiningCode.pdf> [2000 Nodules Regulations]; ISA, 
“The 2010 Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for Polymetallic Sulphides in the Area” (7 May 
2010), online: <http://www.isa.org.jm/files/documents/EN/Regs/PolymetallicSulphides.pdf> [2010 
Sulphides Regulations]. 
90 Seabed Mining Advisory Opinion, supra note 4 at para 123. 
91 Ibid at paras 125–27. 
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which may arise from activities in the Area, the Authority and sponsoring States 
shall apply a precautionary approach, as reflected in Principle 15 of the Rio 
Declaration.”92 Under the Rio Declaration principle 15, states shall apply the 
precautionary approach widely to the environmental protection. But, this 
principle has limited the scope of the precautionary approach to “threats of 
serious or irreversible damage” and to “cost-effective measures to prevent 
environmental degradation”.93 Additionally, the Sulphides Regulations not only 
stimulate sponsoring states’ obligation to adopt precautionary approach but also 
require prospectors, Secretary-Generals, and contractors to take this approach to 
“prevent, reduce and control pollution and other hazards”.94 
Elaborating the precautionary approach into the binding Nodules 
Regulations and the Sulphides Regulations is not the only way to give this 
approach binding force on signatory states. The Chamber noted that “the 
precautionary approach is also an integral part of the general obligation of due 
diligence of sponsoring States.”95 The application of a precautionary approach 
may facilitate the fulfillment of a sponsoring state’s obligation of due diligence. 
As previously discussed, it is necessary to take all appropriate measures to fulfill 
the obligation of due diligence as long as their activities have potential 
environmental risks, even in the absence of full scientific evidence of their adverse 
effects. Thus, the Chamber concluded that “a sponsoring State would not meet 
its obligation of due diligence if it disregarded those risks. Such disregard would 
amount to a failure to comply with the precautionary approach.”96 
                                                                                                                                         
92 See 2000 Nodules Regulations, supra note 89, regulation 31 (2); 2010 Sulphides Regulations, supra note 89, 
regulation 33 (2). 
93 Rio Declaration, supra note 17, principle 15. 
94 See 2010 Sulphides Regulations, supra note 89, regulations 2 (2), 5 (1), 33 (5). 
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96 Ibid. 
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The obligation to prevent transboundary harm has become a principle of 
customary international environmental law.97 It can find adequate support from 
international instruments and case law. Both the Stockholm Declaration principle 
21 and the Rio Declaration principle 2 have enshrined this obligation. In terms 
of international cases, Trail Smelter, Corfu Channel and Lac Lanoux cases have 
supported the existence of this obligation.98 In 1996, the ICJ confirmed that this 
obligation was “part of the corpus of international law relating to the 
environment” in its Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion.99 The ICJ subsequently 
reaffirmed this trend in Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros by stating that, “vigilance and 
prevention are required on account of the often irreversible character of damage 
to the environment and of the limitations inherent in the very mechanism of 
reparation of this type of damage.”100 
The obligation of states to take preventive measures constitutes an 
important part of their obligation of due diligence. The obligation of due diligence 
has been supported by a number of international conventions and non-binding 
instruments and it “[has been] the standard basis for the protection of the 
environment from harm.”101 The typical examples are article 194 (1) of UNCLOS 
and article 2 of the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer.102 
The ILC addressed in the 2001 Draft Articles that the obligation of due diligence 
includes measures taken by states to “minimize risks of significant transboundary 
harm or to prevent such harm.”103 Under the concept of due diligence, the notion 
of prevention can be defined more clearly.104  
                                                                                                                                         
97 ILA, supra note 8 at 22. 
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99 Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 51 at para 29. 
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104 Sage-Fuller, supra note 1 at 79. 
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A state of origin has an obligation of conduct. Under this obligation, states 
are not required to “guarantee that significant harm be totally prevented” or that 
“harm would not occur,” but are required to “exert [their] best possible efforts 
to minimize the risk.”105 The commentaries to the Draft Articles also specified 
that states should adopt appropriate laws and take administrative action regarding 
risk management and take measures to ensure their compliance.106 The obligation 
of due diligence is a continuous obligation for states, which requires them to take 
measures appropriately and proportionally to “the degree of risk of 
transboundary harm”.107 
Under the obligation of prevention, however, activities with uncertain risks 
may remain unregulated. This gap may be filled by the precautionary principle. 
Up until now, the precautionary principle and the obligation to prevent harm 
have been widely treated as separate principles. The Pulp Mills case and the Seabed 
Mining Advisory Opinion highlighted that the principles of prevention and 
precaution are actually interrelated. Judge Trindade in the Pulp Mills case criticized 
the Court’s ignorance of the precautionary principle and advocated that this 
principle should come into play when the preventive principle cannot fully 
resolve the disputes between the parties. The Chamber, in its advisory opinion, 
not only restated states’ obligations of due diligence to prevent harm, but further 
clarified the content of due diligence and its relationship with states’ direct 
obligations (including taking a precautionary measure). These opinions denote 
that “the principle of prevention of harm could be extended in light of 
precaution,” and the precautionary principle may “play a significant role in setting 
the standard of due diligence in the context of scientific uncertainty.”108   
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In the 2014 Legal Principles relating to Climate Change, the International 
Law Association also addressed the idea that prevention and precaution are 
interrelated. The legal principles of prevention and precaution are both included 
in draft article 7 due to their close internal link. Prevention deals with harm or 
risks that are known or knowable and backed with adequate scientific evidence. 
In advance of this state of relative certainty, precaution handles uncertain harm 
or risk.109 Improvements in scientific knowledge may lead to “a finding of 
stronger evidence of harm,” which may further result in “a transition from 
precautionary to preventive measures.”110 Accordingly, these two principles can 
be treated as “forming part of a continuum.”111 
As early as 1999, the ITLOS made an implicit reference to the relationship 
between obligations of due diligence and the precautionary approach in the 
Southern Bluefin Tuna cases.112 Although the ITLOS could not fully assess the 
scientific evidence provided by the parties, it was convinced that due to the 
urgency of the situation, measures should be taken to protect the parties’ rights 
and protect southern bluefin tuna from further degradation. It stated that the 
parties in the case should proceed with due diligence in order to take conservation 
measures.113 Although the Court in the Pulp Mills case circumvented the direct 
application of the precautionary principle, Judges Al-Khasawneh, Simma and 
Trindade indicated the potential application of this principle that had been 
previously considered by the ITLOS in 1999. The Seabed Mining Advisory Opinion 
shed some light on this point. The Seabed Chamber required states to take the 
precautionary approach to realize the obligation of due diligence to prevent harm.  
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In summary, the application of the precautionary principle is closely related 
to the due diligence obligation. On the one hand, the precautionary principle may 
help clarify and enrich the obligation of due diligence both materially and 
procedurally, especially in the circumstances where “there is insufficient evidence 
but…the consequences may be severe and irreversible.”114 On the other hand, 
the due diligence obligation may facilitate the application of the precautionary 
approach in resolving disputes.  
There is a close relationship between due diligence, prevention and 
precaution. The court in the Pulp Mills case restated the status of the preventive 
principle as an international custom and also indicated that this principle 
originated in the obligation of due diligence. Under the due diligence, the notion 
of prevention can be defined more clearly. A state should take all possible 
measures to discharge the obligation of prevention.  
The Seabed Mining Advisory Opinion further analyzed the notions of due 
diligence and precaution by connecting states’ obligations of due diligence with 
their direct obligations of precaution. The Chamber emphasized that the 
precautionary approach is an integral part of the general obligation of due 
diligence for states. The obligations of due diligence require states to exercise best 
possible efforts to avoid harm to the Area or other states, even in face of 
uncertainty. The content of due diligence may also be specified by reference to 
the direct obligations that include the adoption of the precautionary approach. 
Precaution and prevention have been widely regarded as separate concepts. 
However, the Pulp Mills case and the Seabed Mining Advisory Opinion highlighted 
that they are actually interrelated. They form part of a continuum in which the 
precautionary concept may come to play in setting the standard of due diligence 
in the context of scientific uncertainty. With the emergence of strong scientific 
evidence, an obligation to take precautionary measures may become an obligation 
to take preventive action. 
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